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AN APPROACH TO GOD
BY PROFESSOR KARL SCHMIDT
'"T^ HE following pages sketch an argument which is really the cul-
J- minaticn of a whole philosophy. To present it without the
columns and rafters that support it, is a hazardous enterprise. To
carry it out properly would require the literary genius of a Plato,
a Descartes. Yet I attempt it, if only to show that such an argument
can be made today by methods designed primarily to account for our
mathematics and physics.
As a general orientation may I say that my thought moves in the
line of the "Great Tradition," by which I mean that fundamental-
ly consistent mountain range of thinkers which is characterized by
its high peaks : Parmenides, Heracleitos, Plato, Descartes, Leibniz,
Kant. These great thinkers no doubt often seem in direct opposition
to each other ; yet they are fundamentally agreed, and each illumin-
ates the others. Whatever results I have reached, can, I think, be
stated in their terms and be presented as their meaning. This is par-
ticularly true for that strange doctrine of the "separation of prob-
lems" which plays an important part in my argument ; Plato had it in
his mind ; it is the key-note in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. How-
ever these things did not dawn on me until, after a study of the great
masters, I became absorbed in the work of modern logic, and the re-
cent work on the "postulates" of mathematics. Nothing more im-
portant has happened in the history of thought than the work of
these men, mathematicians and physicists, most of them, not pro-
fessional philosophers. This is the background from which I view the
problem of religion. I am not a theologian ; I am not even very fa-
miliar with their theories ; and am therefore glad to be corrected
and instructed. But an approach to God is an intensely personal
matter. The older Plato was quite right in saying that the exist-
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ence of God could be proved ; but quite wrong in thinking that
all atheists should be locked up and taught by the wise men of the
state until they saw the light. This forcible method would have made
a confirmed atheist of me. I was brought up in a Christian Church,
baptised and confirmed in it. I received instruction in the Christian
religion until I was eighteen. I always listened open-mindedly and
with interest. My teachers in religion were good and wise men.
But long before they were through I had stopped praying, I had
stopped going to church. I had stopped believing in God. When
the childhood picture of God the Father left me, nothing took its
place. The question : where is He, had lost all meaning when I
found that He was not in the heavens. Whatever explanations were
given seemed mere quil^bles. My mind avidly seized upon mathe-
matics, physics, chemistry, biology ; and it did not take me long to
discover that, whatever they might think they believed, these teachers
of science did not believe in a God. As I developed I sensed more
and more the antagonism between the scientific man and the man of
religion : religion had been the enemy of modern science, it had,
vainly it is true, but v.'ith brutal force, attemped to block the pro-
gress of scientific thinking. And I was for the men of science ; their
intrepidity, their honesty, their freedom from personal bias, their
steadfast devotion to clarity and truth and complete disregard for
any personal advantage to be gained out of their research made
me align myself with them. I went to the university as a student
of mathematics and natural science.
Even, some years later, after I had been irresistibly drawn to
philosophy, it was the scientific problems and those of ethics, which
attracted me most. When I first read Kant's Critique of Pure Rea-
son I felt a scientist speaking to me ; when I went to study with Her-
mann Cohen at Alarburg it was his emphasis on the relation of Kant
to Xcwton which impressed me most.
I am not writing an autobiography. But on some questions we
cannot speak in a brief paper without stating in the beginning our
personal bias.
And quite clearly my own personal experience was, on the whole,
typical for most of those who went to the University thirty or for-
ty years ago ; it is still, though in the higher strata the winds are
blowing in a very different direction, the frame of mind of most
of us to-day. The attempt of the "humanist" school of theology to
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define religion in terms which do not involve God seems signi-
ficant. Let me take, for example, Professor Haydon's formulation
"the joint quest for the good life.''^ It is clearly an attempt to save
of religion what can be saved at a time when a "God" seems quite
out of reach, inaccessible if existent, but most probably merely a
myth, a poetical figure. The humanist school abandons God openly,
honestly, sincerely ; and this should command respect. It recognizes
the fact that the faith of many of our educated people is corrupted
or wavering ; not because they do not want to believe, but because
they do not see how they honestly can believe, what is presented to
them by our religious leaders. "I will shozv you God and thus prove
to you His reality," said a prominent minister to a large college audi-
ence ; and then pointed to the "World," which, he said, was God's
body. "And as your and my bodies have souls, why should not the
World?" The speaker, it was clear, was in the clutches of a "natural-
istic" philosophy : there was no reality for him except the reality
of natural science. And in this, whatever their dififerences, he and
his audience were at one. He used the "common sense" criterion
:
for anything to exist means : you can lay your hands on it. So, natur-
ally, if God were to "exist," he must be "body," or at least "have"
a body ; and here was his body, the World ! The humanist school,
no doubt, feels that that kind of God is not good for much when it
comes to religion ; with that I agree. And as long as they have
nothing better to ofifer, they prefer to get along with a religion that
omits God altogether. Does this not leave us a noble task, they might
ask? Is there not still an enterprise in which a man may enlist his
best endeavors?—Yes! Yes! A proud challenge: I am all for it.
But it is ethics, let us be clear about it, nothing less, nothing more.
We may ornament it with religious poetry, it still is ethics. And if
we can get no more, we will have to get along. And it is the coun-
sel of despair ; despair of any hope of finding "room" in this world
or out of it for a God. This is our dilemna to-day. The physical
sciences fill all possible space with thetr entities and their laws ; and
the physical sciences are triumphant. We seem to have at best the
choice : cleaving to God, forsaking all physical science ; or, accepting
physical science, admit that the "Gotterdammerung" has come: a
hope, a dream, a fairy tale is at last recognized for what it is : a mere
myth whose historical origins we can now see clearly, whose psy-
iHaydon: The Quest of the Ages.
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chology we begin to understand, but nevertheless a myth. And we,
having at last come to the full stature of men, will put away childish
things.
It does no good to insist, as some do. that science is too arrogant
in its claims, which to a large extent are more like promissory notes,
rather than cash payments ; that it proclaims "laws," but surely
cannot yet explain everything by its laws ; and that science itself
(here they want to let it be known that they are au courant in things
scientific!) is in a great turmoil at present, and not as cock-sure as
it was a little while ago: Xewton is proved wrong to-day, (they say).
Einstein may be proved wrong tomorrow. And thus the cause of
religion is not yet quite hopeless !—A futile endeavor, it seems to
me, to build a nest for religion in the crags and crevices of the wall
which science is erecting. Think of the enormity of having one's
religious needs prompt one to pray for the miscarriage of the scienti-
fic enterprise ! No, if things stand as they say, let us make our
choice and abide by it.
Nor does it do any good to say: a God may be mere poetry and
yet be of great benefit to the believer. I think religious poetry
and, still more, religious music, are a great asset for any civilization
;
no sermon ever stirred me so profoundly, and none, I believe, ever
will, as an adequate performance of Bach's Mass in B minor, or
Beethoven's Missa Solemnis. But this confuses the question. To
say: God is mere poetry ( i. e. a mere fiction), and yet say: believe
in Him, because such believing is very beneficial for you, is some-
thing like saying to a man : No woman exists whom you can love,
but imagine one and love her with all your heart, and it will be
very beneficial for you. It is ridiculous ! God may not exist ; then do
not invite people to believe in Him as if He existed. The philosophy
of the "as if" does not apply here. No, when we begin to count
up the benefits w-hich the belief in God has brought (and, I suppose,
the harm which it has wrought!), we show that the belief has gone;
"he has not heard yet that God is dead."
My position is, quite simply: (1) Religion necessarily involves
God. (2) Science and religion do not exclude each other: there is
"room" for both. (3) My philosophy of nature not only "permits"
God, but demands Him.
I shall not spend time on the first point : I presume we would
all like to agree with it, if only we could find a way to God. For that
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is the important issue : does God "exist." And my argument con-
sists of the steps enumerated above as (2) and (3) : science leaves
"room" for God ; and science demands God.
My work began with a whole-hearted investigation of systems
of mathematics and physics. I wanted to examine and establish their
validity: in what does it consist, and on what does it rest? The
propositions which I shall presently state were obtained to answer
this kind of question, not to find a way to religion, which was then
still "below the horizon." I do not establish these results in this
paper. I shall have to state a few that have a direct bearing on
my present problem, even though I am aware how thin and abstract
they must appear to my readers. They need the background of the
concrete work in Modern Logic, of the details of the investigations
on the Postulates of Mathematics. But no ! Fortunately I think of
Professor Eddington's book The Nature of the Physical World, his
delightful humour, his inimitable clarity and concreteness. Let him
present my first point. He wants to determine the "nature" of the
exact sciences. To do so he says : let us take one of the more intel-
ligible examination questions in physics ; "An elephant slides down
a grassy hillside." Pray read the whole paragraph yourself (1. c.
p. 251) and when you are shaking with laughter, remember that
back of all this humour and madness is the clear and methodical
thought of a great mathematical physicist : the special examination
question is transformed, the "elephant fades out of the problem,"
so does the "grassy slope," until at last there emerges a typical
problem, which is characteristic of physics. That it is stated in terms
of "pointer-reading" is important, but irrelevant to our present pur-
poses. Our first point appears : at the basis of our systems of mathe-
matics, of mechanics, of physics, lie certain "problems" (I called
them "generating problems" in an early paper),- which are
characteristic of these sciences. The second point is that these
generating problems determine the "universes" in which the
propositions of these sciences are respectively "true" ; whether they
have any "truth" outside their own universe is not settled by the
fact of their being true within their own universe. The third
point (and here may T refer again to Eddington's book) is that
problems can be "separated" ; he does this for ethics and religion;
they deal with problems which are important, but entirely distinct
-Ci. Studies in the Structure of Systems, No. 1, 2, 3, 4.' Journal of Philo-
sophy Vol. IX, No. 8. Vol. IX, No. 12, Vol. IX, No. 16, Vol. X, No. 3,
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from the problems about "pointer-readings." In other words, the
separation of problems establishes the separation of the respective
universes. It limits the validity of the laws of physics, and
provides room for totally different universes in which the laws
of physics may be false or irrelevant ; and vice versa. But to
establish this we require the further point : namely, that, though
every theorem of mathematics, etc. is proved true by showing that
it follows from certain "axioms" (or "postulates" as E. V. Hun-
tington calls them, or "hypotheses" in the Platonic manner of speak-
which Riemann adopted in his famous dissertation "iJber die Hy-
pothesen welche der Geometric zu Grunde liegen), the "postulates"
themselves (by no means "evident-and-therefore-needing-no-war-
rant") derive their validity from the fact that they are "necessary
for the solution of their respective generating problems."
These propositions suffice to make room for religion. Show
that you are dealing with a legitimate problem, distinct from the
generating problem of physics, and postulate whatever is necessary
for the solution of this problem, paying no attention to the propo-
sitions of physics which are irrelevant, being limited in their validity
to the generating problem of physics.
The next concern will be to state the criteria by which the pos-
tulates and theorems are tested. They are already vaguely referred
to when we speak of the postulates as "necessary." My early pa-
per on Critique of Cognition and Its Principles^' is in some re-
spects antiquated, but on the whole still states the case correctly.
There are two features of it which are essential here. One is that
"truth" applies only to "systems," and thus to propositions only as
integral parts of systems, but not to propositions in isolation. Some
such feature is made necessary e. g. by the existence of the "non-
Euclidean," "non-Archimedean" etc., geometries, and it is of fun-
damental importance. The second is that the criteria determine
"truth", even in physics, without assuming "objects and their
properties" as given. The philosophy which William James has
called the "philosophy of comon sense" (cf. Pragmatism, lecture V)
is characterized by this latter assumption, and by its criterion of
truth of propositions in terms of "agreement with its object." Our
procedure is thus fundamentally different from this philosophy,
which is nevertheless the philosophy of the man in the street, and
3Cf. Journal of Philos. Vol. VI, No. 11, May 27, 1909.
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our own when we are not philosophizing. For, whilst fundamental-
ly inconsistent and inadequate, it has a simplicity in handling some
situations which a better philosophy can express only with an al-
most ridiculous complexity. (Please read the delightful passage
in Eddington's book"* about the difficulties encountered bv a modern
physicist trying to enter an open doorway.)
Next we must give our definition of "existence." This definition
incorporates a considerable amount of "metaphysical" theory, and
requires therefore careful justification. I omit the justification and
state the definition: by "existence" we understand what is "meant"
by a "true" proposition ; or, what a true proposition is "about."
This seems to put things up-side down ; we usually define truth in
terms of existence ; or rather the "philosophy of common sense"
does
!
Two more definitions and I am done with the assembling of the
necessary apparatus. By ''reality" I understand objective existence
(or: existence as object) ; and by ''actuality" I understand exis-
tence as subject. I will here take "object" and "subject" for granted,
merely adding that the two are, for us at least, always understood
to be linked together. It is well to bear in mind that actuality and
reality are here not equivalent terms ; they both mean existence,
but existence of differing (and contrasted) kinds. It is hardly neces-
sary to emphasize that the above statements and definitions lead to
dififerent kinds of existence (and reality), according to the respec-
tive universes in which the propositions which "mean" existence
are true. At least it leaves this as a possibility ; and thus it be-
comes possible to distinguish mathematical existence from physi-
cal existence, ethical existence, etc.
We begin with the "empirical self," i. e. I begin with my experi-
ences, which as such are "merely" subjective ; and I ask myself
:
are there any which also "mean" an e.vistant, and what are the con-
ditions which the latter must satisfy. (This, at bottom, is Kant's
problem in the Critique of Pure Reason; here emerges "experience"
in the neiv meaning given to it by Kant.) Propositions which are
parts of systems embodying solutions of generating problems,
and not found wanting when tested by the criteria of truth, these
are the stepping stones by which I proceed from "my experiences"
to "reality" in its various aspects: cosmological, ethical, aesthetical
4V. 1. c. p. 342.
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reality. In each case we must state the generating problem, and
show that each is distinct ; thereby establishing each in its own
sovereignty: the conditions necessary for the solution of its prob-
lem, tested by the criteria of truth, are the laws of the land. What-
ever laws are valid in any of the other universes is "irrelevant."
It will be noticed that "religion" is not mentioned above. Is
it, after all, to be omited from reality? Even though there may
be "room" for it ? I will admit that at first I expected to find the
generating problem of religion on a line, so to speak, with the other
three. Nothing more was necessary to establish it in its own right
than to state it, and to separate it from the others. And I thought this
a simple matter, if I held to the fact that religion involves God. None
of the others does. God is not an hypothesis in physics. Neither is
He in "ethics" ; nor in "aesthetics." These are established autonom-
ously before we come to God and religion. This point is important.
Yet the fact remained that traditionally religion is supposed to
have a very close and special relation to ethics ; undoubtedly a good
part of all sermons preached u ethics. On the other hand we should
not overlook its close relation to art, and even to cosmology. I do
not mean primarily the fact that at a primitive stage religion may
be also a cosmology. "In the beginning God created the Heaven
and the Earth." But a good part of the speculations of Plato, of
Descartes, deserve careful attention here ; as well as the fact that
all the great scientists, from the pre-Socratic giants down, were
upheld in the search for laws of nature by their belief in the exis-
tence of such laws, which was based ultimately on religious grounds.
The intimacy of these relations (quite distinct from the "inter-
penetration of distinct generating problems in "concrete" ob-
jects) called to mind the corresponding closeness in the case of the
psychological problem. I do not wish to discuss this here, but for
me it is concerned with the subject-relation of the entities of mathe-
matics, physics, etc. Be that as it may, it made me realize that,
absorbed in the "aspects of reality," we had quite left out of ac-
count the "subject" to which "reality," i.e. ''objective existence,"
is related.
What is this subject? Not the "empirical I" with which we
started. Yet the subject we are looking for "states" propositions,
"makes" assertions, "joins" them into systems, "tests" them by cri-
teria of truth which it had stated and tested. The subject appears
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thus as an "active," "spontaneous," "creative" I ; as the creator of
true propositions; and thus as the creator of "reality!"
This is inescapable, if one defines reahty as "objective existence,"
and existence as the meaning of true propositions. It thus becomes
imperative to examine those definitions with the greatest care. The
only escape would seem to be the assumption of "things in them-
selves," in the form of the philosophy of common sense, or at least
in Locke's modified form. But even if things-in-themselves could
be made intelligible, they seem to have no bearing on the procedure
of the experimental scientist. No physicist compares propositions
with "things-in-themselves." He makes observations, examines his
data, makes hypotheses to account for the data, checks them by
rules which are the criteria of truth. "Pointer-readings" and their
"connections." The scientist does not take "reality" as given; it
presents a very serious problem. It is an interesting fact that the
president of the American Chemical Society in his recent presiden-
tial address"^ raises this problem of reality, and answers it in part
by a method which corresponds very closely to our own. He does
not assume reality. Let us say: Reality emerges as the sciences pro-
gress, as new laws are stated, new facts discovered.
"I" am the creator of reality: the position is inescapable. It is
the proudest thing that can be said by man of man. It expresses the
spirit of the present time. We have created so many "things ;"
let "reality" be added unto them.
And yet, though inescapable, it is utterly incredible. Not only
is it sheer arrogance ; it is absurd.
But how can we escape this absurdity? It is not just our per-
sonal dilemna. Take Kant. The interpretation of his language in the
Critique of Pure Reason has varied widely. Kant, the fastidious in
point of veracity and exactness, who can write delightfully clear
German (his earlier papers prove it!) but who develops an elabor-
ate, not to say clumsy style, expanding each sentence so as to make
it express all the truth and nothing but the truth ! Why, then, was
not his meaning plain to the careful reader? Why have whole li-
braries of books been written about him? Why, after more than a
century of keen and intensive study of his works, is there yet no
^'Irving Langmuir: Modern Concepts in Physics and their Relation to
Chemistry. The Journal of the American Chemical Society. Oct. 1929, Vol.
51. No. 10. My attention was called to this interesting paper by my col-
league of the chemistry department, Professor A. T. Lincoln.
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general agreement on their meaning? But consider; is not the 'ob-
ject" insisted upon throughout? And yet, by taking its coercive
function as the characteristic condition which distinguishes the ob-
jective from the purely subjective; by recognizing that coercion is
necessity, and grounding all necessity in the a priori (which comes
to mean "necessary and of universal validity"), have we not thus
landed in the subjective, more subjective even than our sensations?
And when he proclaims as the key-note of his new "method of
thinking" : "we know of things a priori only that which we ourselves
put into them", and yet invites us to distinguish this from a mere
fiction, "andichten" as he says, the paradox is complete. "We our-
selves" the ground and source of objectivity! (Alay I be permitted
to call attention to Eddington's repeated similar statement : "in
the discovery of this system of law the mind may be regarded as
regaining from Nature that which the mind has put into Nature."
(I.e. p. 244)
And did not Descartes call such things as the sun of astronomy,
and the mathematical entities (which are the only reality in things,)
did he not call them "idees innees?" We are not trying to interpret
him ; we emphasize the paradox, which ultimately goes back to
Plato's Doctrine of Ideas, does it not?
How shall we solve the paradox ?
Not by looking tozvards reality and beyond it to a super-reality,
an "epekeina", to an "ens realissimum" : there is nothing beyond
reality.
By a "conversion," a turning around, away from reality, aivay
from the objective, and toivcirds a subject, beyond the empirical
Ego, beyond even Kant's transcendental I, towards the ultimate
"actuality," "activity," "creativity." Our pride collapses, is stricken
down: We the creators of reality, we? No! God is the creator!
Through us He creates reality. But it is He ! Man the measure of
all things, man? No, said the mature Plato, not man, but God is the
measure.
Great scientists have always felt this, when they explored na-
ture and through law created cosmos out of chaos : it was God
working through them. Great artists have always been aware of
it: Their creation? No! God's handiwork. However deliberately
they planned, however carefully they wrought, whatever efifort and
labor they spent on mastering the technique : the creation occurred
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under the spell of "inspiration." And the prophets who come to
reform and save a sinful world, in olden times and in new, do
they not feel themselves the "servants of God," doing His will, car-
rying out His bidding?
This is the religious point of view. These are attempted answers
to religious questions; thus to conceive reality, thus to labor, to
create it in this spirit, is to be religious. It is a new and impera-
tive problem. Physics, ethics, art give no relevant answer to it.
They necessarily disregard the subject; "actuality" does not enter
into their discussions. The only security to be found here is state-
able in terms of generating problem and conditions necessary for
its solution. All their necessity, all their truth is contained in their
laws. To them we must appeal, by them we must justify, with them
we demonstrate and deduce. But when once the problem of the
subject is raised, when we ask: who creates these true propositions,
who warrants them, who is the guarantor, the sanctuary of reality,
in which it finds its last security, then there is no stopping: Reality
cannot be left suspended from a mere point, the "I" ; not even the
"creative I," still "I." It is firmly grounded when it is grounded in
"actuality," in the ultimate active existant. "Our heart is unquiet
until it rests in Thee." Reality seemed at first to be the meaning
of true propositions which "I" proposed ; but God spoke through
me when I spoke tmly; and reality is His meaning. God is the
measure of all truths.
Our troubles are not ended. How can we know God, actuality,
the ultimate subject? Do we not inevitably, in the knowing process,
make Him an object?'' And does not this exclude knowledge of
Him?' Yes, and no! We do n-ot know Him as "object," i. e. we
do not know Him as "reality." God is not "reality" : He is not a
physical reality ; He is therefore not in space, not in time ; he is not
eternal in a temporal sense. But He is not even an ethical or aestheti-
cal reality ; he is not good ; he is not beautiful. It is to me a refresh-
ing confirmation of the correctness of our results that I am thus
able to understand those who teach a "negative" theology. If we
are right, we confirm their statements.
But we can say some positive things about God. It is true, I
think, that I am the only subject with which I have direct acquain-
tance. But there are other "subjects," you for instance, of whom I
6This question was raised by one of my students in Carleton, Miss Edith
Watson.
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may have knowledge. Not the way I know about "reality" (except-
ing your "bodies," of which we are not speaking now) ; but I can
know a great deal about you from your acts, your behavior, your
responses of all kinds. And so with God: we know about Him, in
90 far as we know His creation, reality; we learn to know His
"ways," when we study mathematics, physics, ethics, art. And this
is the only way.
Above we said : cosmological, ethical, aesthetical reality is es-
tablished, and must be established autonomously, before even the
problem of God can be raised. Laws hold in physics, in ethics, in
aesthetics in their own right. They are not dependent on God. A
law is not a law in physics because God "thought" it ; an act is not
good because He commanded it ; a work of art is not beautiful be-
cause He inspired it. We have no direct knowledge of God's
thought, will, or feeling. It is the other way around: we recognize
this law, this good act, this beautiful work of art as His, because it
is true, good, or beautiful. That is: having found it true, good, or
beautiful, when we tested it, now, when we raise the religious prob-
lem (not incidentally, but inevitably) and make the fundamental
hypothesis "God" as "actuality," we recognize Him in the true, the
good, the beautiful, their creator, their guarantor. (In other words
we never, not even here, abandon our methodological procedure
that guided us throughout, and which may be termed indifferently
the Platonic method of the hypothesis, or Kant's transcendental
method.) This implies,—does it not?—that those who want to know
Him, are invited to study "reality." But we should add : there are
many ways ; and you may be "zvise" without necessarily being
"learned."
In the foregoing, two points have clashed with traditional the-
ories so much that it may seem doubtful whether we had any right
to call this "actuality," this "creator," God. We said He was not a
"reality" (though of course He "exists" ; "actuality" implies that)
;
and He was not necessarily 'good." To the second I might retort,
that "good is as good does" ; but that is flippancy. Is it not better
to say: what, you puny creature, you want to measure God by your
standards of ethics ? I think this is the true answer. But what of the
first? Has not God been defined as "ens realissimum" ? He has.
But rightly? Better: zi'hy was He so defined, if not to guarantee
reality: He "bestoived", whatever of reality things had. And it
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seemed that He could not bestow reality, unless He had it Himself
in the highest degree.—But this would not elevate Him; it would
degrade Him, put Him with physical entities, as a sort of primus
inter pares. No ; no reality can bestozv reality. His must be a differ-
ent kind of "existence." It is easy to recognize in this "ens realissi-
mum" the Platonic idea of the "good," "which imparts truth ("real-
ity" in A. E. Taylor's better translation) to the object and knowl-
edge to the subject" (Rep. Bk. VI, Jowett's translation) ; but the
"good" is "beyond" reality; it "far exceeds essence in power and
dignity." A puzzling statement to every student of Plato; on which
our theory seems to throw some light.
We have spoken of religion in a purely intellectual manner, as
behooves a philosopher. He must be blind, who does not see that
this is only part of the story : profound emotions are linked up
with our religious ideas, beautiful imagery is woven around them.
What we have tried to do is to justify them, not to replace them.
And it is interesting that our argument gives a philosophical reason
for those definitions of religion which, like Schleiermacher's, char-
acterize it by "feelings of dependency."
Not to convert the "infidel" and the "skeptic", but to sustain the
believer, to help him clarify and purify his ideas of God, has been
the moving purpose of this paper.
